25 Years After 9/11: Former CENTCOM Commander’s Strategic Warning on What America Still Gets Wrong

Admiral William J. “Fox” Fallon (Ret.), the only U.S. officer in history to command both U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), spent more than four decades at the center of some of America’s most critical military decisions. 

From Vietnam, to Beirut, to the Pentagon on 9/11, to steering military strategy across two theaters during the height of the Global War on Terror, Fallon’s new memoir, “Decisions, Discord & Diplomacy: From Cairo to Kabul” offers a rare insider’s view. In an exclusive interview with Military.com, Admiral Fallon delivers a clear strategic warning: America continues to sacrifice long-term stability for short-term political wins. 

His service, from both inside the beltway all the way to the points of friction at America’s biggest flashpoints, provides invaluable insight into the range of challenges that strategic advisors face across the spectrum of the instruments of national power. Early in his memoir, he offers the following sage wisdom that will become a theme:

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been too quick to use the military in response to global challenges. We seem to have forgotten about the other instruments of statecraft.

September 11th – Inside the Pentagon

Admiral Fallon was serving as the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in 2001. As he drove into the Pentagon on the morning of September 11th, he made note of the crystal-clear blue sky and cool weather after a hot summer. Jumping into a morning meeting, his attention was quickly brought to the news on television screens in the room. As an experienced naval aviator, he knew right away that something was amiss.

I said out loud – that was no accident.

There was little time for anyone to unpack the complexity of what was happening, though there was an understanding that multiple airplanes had been hijacked. Less than an hour later, Fallon heard and felt the explosion of Flight 77 impacting the building. In that moment, he said, “There was no doubt in my mind what happened.” 

Like countless other Americans, the attack would quickly become very personal to the Admiral. He would learn that a good friend, Rear Admiral Wilson “Bud” Flagg, and his wife, Dee, were on board Flight 77. Further, 42 of Admiral Fallon’s sailors and civilians would give their lives that day in the Pentagon – he knew every one of them.

Fallon and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) quickly surmised they needed to split up for the purposes of continuity of command in case the attack continued. The CNO would relocate to the Washington Navy Yard while Fallon was moved to the nearby Bureau of Naval Personnel. He expeditiously made his way through the unfolding chaos and found a pair of Marines at nearby Henderson Hall, armed with M-16s, who helped the Admiral get to the Annex.

I saw very interesting things from people of all ranks. From the utmost valor to people screaming and running away. I thought to myself: It was just like combat. Some people do well, and some others do not.

A complete unity of effort, Fallon described, by the Navy and the Marines ensured a continuity of operations throughout all of it. As the dust settled, Admiral Fallon knew that with Afghanistan looming, it was not going to be easy, and U.S. retaliation was going to have to come from the sea. In short order, he began getting orders out to subordinate commanders to start preparing for the long war ahead.

From PACOM to CENTCOM: Strategic Visions and Washington Pressure

In 2005, Admiral Fallon was appointed as the Commander, U.S. PACOM (now called USINDOPACOM). As the commander, he oversaw military relations across 36 nations in Asia and the Pacific; a theater far larger with extreme, unique, and underserved requirements while the Global War on Terror (GWOT) raged. 

While trying to contain North Korean nuclear ambitions and rising tensions with China, Fallon was forced to contend with his own resources that would be directed toward the Middle East. His knowledge of what it would take to succeed in PACOM is equal parts prescient and timeless: he emphasized sustained power projection capabilities, core warfighting competencies, and preventing skill atrophy. Principles rooted in readiness across all domains, not just reactive surges.

These lessons carried forward directly into his role at CENTCOM when, in early 2007, he was nominated to be the commander. This would mark the first naval officer to command the combatant command, and unusual to go from one combatant command to another. The Washington environment, however, would prove the most challenging of all. Difficult dynamics with General Petraeus and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (including back-channel communications that bypassed the traditional chain-of-command) would complicate a unified strategy.

Fallon disagreed sharply on the drawdown timeline associated with the Iraq surge and the risk-averse approach that prolonged U.S. involvement. He suggested that the U.S. transition the military structure in Iraq in anticipation of a long-term security agreement between the countries. But other key stakeholders were focused exclusively on the short term. 

Frustration mounted over the administration’s short-term political focus, prioritizing immediate tactical “wins” and optics over strategic patience, which ignored broader implications for regional stability and squandered opportunities such as a negotiated framework for enduring U.S.-Iraq ties that he helped shape but saw unraveled post-2008.

Afghanistan in 2007-2008: The Blind Spot That Still Haunts

While Afghanistan was one of the highest priorities for CENTCOM during his tenure as the commander, it was still immensely overshadowed by the surge efforts concurrently being brought to bear in Iraq. Asked if national leaders truly understood the nature of the Afghan War in 2007, Admiral Fallon emphatically replied: “No. They didn’t get it.”

Fallon himself, though, laments the attitude toward Afghanistan during this period. The biggest mistake, Fallon says, he made was visiting Afghanistan in 2007, listening to all the reports, and thinking, “Okay, this place is pretty stable. Particularly compared to Iraq.”

What Fallon missed, he said, was the extent to which the resurgent Taliban were masking their efforts to re-establish their presence throughout the country. “I missed it. I didn’t pick up on it until it was too late. I was confident in the relative stability of Afghanistan compared to Iraq.”

Afghanistan had a unique, NATO-specific command structure that differed greatly from Iraq. While this added an advantage of having different eyes to look at different things, it would still cause disruptions with commanders reporting to NATO headquarters and CENTCOM. 

In spite of these challenges, Fallon decided that “we were not likely to have an Iraq-type dustup, at least not while I was there,” that would have necessitated the same type of main force sweep through the country that Iraq received. To put things in perspective at this time, Iraq had 20 combat brigades in the country – compared to only one in Afghanistan.

Other unique challenges persisted in Afghanistan. Efforts to field modern, U.S.-style aviation assets (such as F-16 fighters) for the Afghan Air Force were squashed by the Admiral – the ability for the Afghan Air Force to maintain such modern equipment was simply nonexistent. 

There were requests by the Karzai administration to bulk up the Afghan National Army to ~200,000 soldiers due to literacy and management concerns. Nonetheless, Fallon did recognize that the resilience of the Afghan people was far stronger than what he witnessed in Iraq. But that would prove to be a double-edged sword:

The self-resilience of the Afghans lulled me to sleep and made me think they could get it done.

Strategic Warning: Prioritize Long-Term Visions Over Short-Term Tactical Wins

Admiral Fallon’s reflections cut to the core of America’s post-9/11 military struggles: the persistent temptation to chase short-term political victories at the expense of genuine strategic patience and enduring outcomes. In his view, this pattern has repeatedly undermined U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, turning hard-won tactical gains into fleeting illusions while the bigger picture (regional stability, sustainable alliances, and realistic end-states) slips away.

He points directly to how this short-term political thinking overrides strategic realities. During his CENTCOM tenure, Fallon saw this play out vividly in Iraq, where the surge delivered tactical success but prolonged U.S. entanglement because leaders hesitated on forcing a faster transition to Iraqi control. He pushed for quicker handoffs and a negotiated framework for long-term U.S.-Iraq ties, only to watch it unravel post-2008 as the administration prioritized quick closure over sustained presence. 

“The president wanted to wrap things up as soon as possible,” Fallon recalled, highlighting how electoral cycles and optics trumped the patient diplomacy required for lasting influence.

A recurring frustration for Fallon is how critical lessons from past conflicts, especially Vietnam-era counterinsurgency (COIN), were discarded and then painfully re-learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. “The lessons of Vietnam went out the door,” he said bluntly. “The fact that the army and Marine Corps had to relearn counterinsurgency was appalling.” 

This lesson goes beyond institutional amnesia; it reflects a general failure to maintain core competencies across domains (e.g., power projection, air defense, mine warfare, etc.), allowing skills to atrophy under shifting priorities. The military paid dearly for this neglect, as short-term focus on immediate fights sidelined the sustained readiness needed for complex, protracted conflicts.

Fallon emphasizes that while technology advances, human behavior and the patterns of history remain stubbornly constant. “Very little is new in our lives,” he observed. “People have been acting the same for millennia; technology changes, sure, but human behaviors are still the same.” This timeless reality demands rigorous historical study to spot recurring pitfalls before they repeat. Without it, leaders risk being blindsided by the same miscalculations (over-optimism, mission creep, bureaucratic infighting) that have plagued U.S. interventions since 9/11.

The essential leadership principle Fallon advocates is for military commanders to try to nudge politicians toward sustained planning rather than quick headlines. Military leaders must remind civilian decision-makers that “the chances of something being a one-and-done are low” and that strategic success requires thinking beyond the next election cycle or news cycle. Fallon’s own tenure exemplified this tension: he tried to steer toward long-term regional stability, but Washington’s short-term impulses often prevailed.

His final call is unequivocal: learn history rigorously or risk repeating the same costly mistakes. “There are a lot of lessons out there,” Fallon stressed. “The key thing is to learn them.” In an era of great-power competition and persistent irregular threats, ignoring this imperative invites more calamity, wasted resources, and eroded national resolve. 

Fallon’s warning is not defeatist, but rather it is a call for a disciplined, forward-looking strategy that respects hard realities rather than political expediency. As America marks 25 years since 9/11, his insights remind us that true victory demands patience, competence, and an unflinching grasp of history’s unchanging lessons.

Admiral William J. Fallon’s book, “DECISIONS, DISCORD & DIPLOMACY: From Cairo to Kabul,” was released in December and is available anywhere books are sold.