Russian Satellite Activity Exposes Gaps in Satellite Communications Security

Recent maneuvers by Russian satellites near European geostationary communications platforms have highlighted the risks to unencrypted command links and data transmissions. These developments emphasize the critical importance of resilient and diverse communication methods for military operations, government functions and commercial services that rely on space-based infrastructure.

Military.com had the opportunity to speak with space entrepreneur Laurynas Mačiulis, chief executive officer of Astrolight, a Lithuanian company focused on optical communications technology. 

Mačiulis discussed how laser-based systems can address vulnerabilities exposed by these orbital activities.

Russian Satellites Approach European Platforms

European security officials (speaking to Financial Times on Feb. 4) believe two Russian spacecraft, Luch-1 and Luch-2, have intercepted signals from at least a dozen key satellites serving Europe, parts of Africa and the Middle East. Luch-2, launched in 2023, has approached 17 European geostationary satellites since its deployment.

Orbital tracking data shows Luch-2 has lingered within tens of kilometers of targets such as Intelsat 39, Eutelsat 3C, Eutelsat 9B, SES-5, Astra 4A and others. The satellite has conducted multiple course changes, moving east and west while positioning itself near these assets for extended periods.

Officials reportedly suspect that the Russian vehicles may have been conducting signals intelligence operations by positioning themselves within the narrow beam cones used for data transmission between ground stations and satellites. Many of the targeted satellites carry civil communications, including television and broadband services, but also support government and military traffic.

Unencrypted Links Create Vulnerabilities

A major concern centers on older satellites launched years ago without advanced encryption on their command uplinks. These platforms lack modern onboard computers capable of securing command data. As a result, sensitive information transmitted in the clear could be captured.

Intercepted command links might allow an adversary to mimic ground operators. Further, false commands could alter satellite trajectories, knock platforms out of alignment or, in extreme cases, cause them to drift or deorbit.

German Major General Michael Traut, head of Germany's military space command, described the activity as signals intelligence operations. 

A senior European intelligence official noted that even without full decryption, valuable details could be gathered, such as satellite usage patterns and ground terminal locations.

The incidents fit the ever increasing pattern of Russian hybrid warfare in Europe and beyond. Officials link them to other disruptive actions, including sabotage of subsea internet and power cables. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has called satellite networks an Achilles heel of modern societies. Such attacks could potentially paralyze entire nations.

Laser Systems Offer Secure Alternatives

Diverse communication technologies are essential to reduce single points of failure. While radio frequency systems remain dominant they are susceptible to interception and interference when encryption is absent or signals can be accessed.

Astrolight develops compact laser communication terminals for satellites and portable optical ground stations. The company's ATLAS terminals enable high-speed space-to-space and space-to-ground links using narrow optical beams.

Mačiulis explained that laser communications provide inherent security advantages over radio frequency. 

The extremely directional beams make interception difficult without precise alignment in the path of the light. This reduces risks from proximity operations like those conducted by Luch satellites.

In addition, laser systems resist jamming and electromagnetic interference more effectively than radio frequency alternatives. They support higher data rates while requiring less size, weight and power, making them suitable for both large geostationary platforms and smaller satellites in proliferated constellations.

Astrolight has conducted tests with the European Space Agency, including demonstrations of a laser communication link between Astrolight’s OGS-1 optical ground station, located at Teide Observatory in Tenerife, Spain, and an experimental laser transmitter system, Osiris, onboard the Flying Laptop satellite. The company positions its technology for civil and defense applications, including NATO-relevant secure links in contested environments.

Implications for U.S. and Allied Forces

The United States Space Force and allied partners have invested in resilient architectures, including optical crosslinks in programs like the Space Development Agency's proliferated warfighter space architecture. These efforts align with calls for greater diversity in satellite communications to counter hybrid threats.

European officials express growing worry that Russian reconnaissance in space is expanding. Moscow launched Cosmos 2589 and Cosmos 2590 last year, vehicles with similar maneuvering capabilities. Luch-1 appears to have suffered a propulsion issue in late January, resulting in fragmentation and tumbling.

For U.S. military operations that depend on allied satellite capacity for communications, navigation and intelligence, these events signal the need for accelerated adoption of secure optical technologies. Proliferated low Earth orbit constellations with inter-satellite laser links offer redundancy, and legacy geostationary assets can still play vital roles.

Mačiulis noted that integrating laser terminals on new satellites can harden command and control links. Combined with encryption upgrades and improved space domain awareness, such measures strengthen overall resilience.

The incidents involving the Russian Luch satellites serve as a timely reminder. Relying on a narrow set of communication methods in space creates exploitable weaknesses. Developing and deploying diverse, hardened alternatives such as laser systems will prove essential for maintaining operational advantage in an increasingly contested orbital domain.