Students of military history know the battle of Kursk in 1943 as the largest-ever clash of armoured forces – a battle that would prove a vital turning point in the defeat of Nazi Germany. It was a battle that devoured the strength of the German armed forces, and demonstrated the growing effectiveness of the Red Army and maturity of its general staff.
The battle opened on July 5 1943. It saw an initial German offensive south of Moscow, which aimed to regain the initiative lost after their epic defeat at Stalingrad earlier in the year. But this German push was swiftly blunted by the defensive tactics of the Soviet armed forces, and was followed by a Russian counteroffensive which drove a degraded and deflated enemy ever further to the west, opening up the road to Berlin and defeat for Hitler’s Nazi regime.
In 2024, with a major offensive being played out once again within the Kursk oblast in western Russia, commentators wonder about parallels with the past – and how this operation might shape the outcome of the current war between Russia and Ukraine.
The purpose of the Ukrainian attack – beyond the chance to change the narrative of the conflict and deliver a much-needed morale boost – is the subject of much speculation. Is the aim to grab territory and take Russian prisoners, to give Kyiv some clout at the negotiating table? Or is it designed to draw Russian troops away from the frontlines in eastern Ukraine, where they have been steadily making ground?
Laying the plan
The purpose of the German offensive in 1943 was similarly less than clear. Ostensibly, the goal was to pinch out a large bulge in the Russian line on the eastern front, running 160 miles from north to south. The city of Kursk at its centre provided a focus for the German armoured spearheads, which would thrust into the base of the bulge like a pair of scalpels.
On the one hand, this made defensive sense. With the German armed forces having lost more than 200,000 men in the defeat at Stalingrad, a straighter front line would be easier to defend. But there were others who hoped that, with the introduction of the latest generation of tanks such as the Tiger and Panther, Germany could get back to the winning ways of Blitzkrieg that had defeated France in six weeks in 1940, and carried the army to the outskirts of Moscow in 1941.
Victory at Kursk, it was hoped, would get German forces moving again and restore belief in the final victory that had been so badly shaken by Stalingrad.
The plan was for twin offensives: one in the north led by the 9th Army, which was ordered to press southwards and link up with the 4th Panzer Army, which was directed to forge a path northwards from the Belgorod region, cutting off the Soviet troops in the bulge.
Hitler committed 777,000 troops, more than 2,400 tanks and 2,000 aircraft – and these resources were not committed lightly. At this point in the war, Hitler’s forces were being pressured in the Mediterranean, battered from above by British and American airforces, threatened with invasion from the west, as well as being steamrollered in the east by the Russian army. So these were not resources which Germany could replace.
In other words, Kursk was a massive gamble on Hitler’s part. But Germany’s high command must have believed it was better to gamble than accept some form of defensive stalemate – or slow defeat on the eastern front, as the Russians drove back the Germans kilometre by kilometre by sheer weight of numbers.
German delay and Russian defence
From laying the initial plans for an offensive in March, the build-up of German forces took several months. Russia used this time to build up the kind of defence in depth that would become one of the hallmarks of its army – and was most recently seen blunting the much-heralded Ukrainian summer offensive of 2023.
Long before the 1943 offensive was ready to launch, senior German commanders were convinced that the moment for it had passed. When the offensive began on July 5, the Russians had long been ready and were well dug in.
This was in part thanks to a Russian spy. John Cairncross – who was stationed in England at Bletchley Park, the centre of Allied code-breaking – passed to his Russian handlers decrypts of German coded messages showing its attack plan.
The resulting defence in depth severely impeded the assault of the German armoured columns. By July 10, it was clear the thrust from the north had stalled and, a week later, efforts in the south came to an end as concerns over the Allied landings in Sicily diverted Hitler’s attention elsewhere.
By July 12, the Russians were launching their own counteroffensive in the north, which would force the German line back – albeit at considerable cost. By August 4, the city of Orel, in the heart of German-held territory, was liberated and by August 18, the German army had taken up defensive positions east of Bryansk. It had lost 30 of its 50 divisions, and up to 500,000 men were killed, wounded or missing in action.
Decisive defeat
The battle was a turning point in the conflict in the east. While Russian losses were multiples of those suffered by Germany, with its military-industrial machine now working at full capacity, the Red Army swiftly demonstrated its capacity to regenerate. Germany, meanwhile. would never again be capable of trying to take the strategic initiative against Russia.
At Kursk, the road to Stalingrad became the road to Berlin. It is too soon to tell whether Ukraine’s Kursk counteroffensive will prove as similarly decisive for either Kyiv or Moscow. But for the moment at least, it appears to be advantage Kyiv.
Harry Bennett is Associate Professor (Reader) in History, University of Plymouth
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
